Deterrence Dictionary
Deterrence: “the prevention of action by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the perceived benefits”[1]
“the prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction”[2]
“the discouragement of the initiation of military aggression by the threat (implicit or explicit) of applying military force in response to the aggression”[3]
“discouraging the enemy from taking military action by posing for him a prospect of cost and risk outweighing his prospective gain”[4]
“the use of a threat by one party in an attempt to convince another party to refrain from some action. Reliance on nuclear weapons is neither specified in this definition nor even implied”[5]
“steps taken to prevent opponents from initiating armed actions and to inhibit escalation if combat occurs”[6]
“the persuasion of one's opponent that the costs and/or risks of a given course of action he might take outweigh its benefits”[7]
“the object of deterrence is to persuade an adversary that the costs to him of seeking a military solution to his political problems will far outweigh the benefits”[8]
“a situation in which one side (i.e., deterrer) threatens to retaliate if the other side takes some action unacceptable to the deterrer. The major function of deterrence is to prevent some action from happening.. In the military context, its most common purpose is to prevent an adversary from using force”[9]
“seeks to prevent undesired behavior by convincing those who might contemplate such action that its costs would exceed its gains”[10]
“the attempt by policymakers in state A to prevent, by threat of retaliatory sanction or contingent reward, the policymakers of state B from initiating a specific course of action in pursuit of policy objectives”[11]
“deterrence is a form of preventive influence that rests primarily on negative incentives”[12]
“the effective communication of a self-enforced prediction that activity engaged in by another party will bring forth a response such that no gain from said activity will occur, and that a net loss is more probable”[13]
“one party prevents another from doing something the first party does not want by threatening to harm the other party seriously if it does”[14]
“the convincing of a potential aggressor that the consequences of coercion or armed conflict would outweigh the potential gains. This requires the maintenance of a credible military capability and strategy with the clear political will to act”[15]
“a measure of set of measures designed to narrow an opponent’s freedom of choice among possible policies by raising the cost of some of them to levels thought to be unacceptable. The terms is usually used in the more specialized sense of discouraging a nuclear attack by arousing the fear of retaliation”[16]
“in its broadest sense, means persuading an opponent not to initiate a specific action because the perceived benefits do not justify the estimated costs and risks”[17]
“the practice of discouraging or restraining someone—in world politics, usually a nation-state—from taking unwanted actions, such as an armed attack. It involves an effort to stop or prevent an action, as opposed to the closely related but distinct concept of ‘compellence’, which is an effort to force an actor to do something”[18]
Deterrence by punishment: “threatens severe penalties, such as nuclear escalation or severe economic sanctions, if an attack occurs” [19]
“threatens to impose costs through retaliation that may be unrelated to the aggression itself. Rather than focusing on the denial of local objectives, it seeks to raise the cost of aggression—even if successful— by threatening other consequences”[20]
Deterrence by denial: strategies that “seek to deter an action by making it infeasible or unlikely to succeed, thus denying a potential aggressor confidence in attaining its objectives—deploying sufficient local military forces to defeat an invasion, for example.”[21]
“a somewhat jargonistic way of talking about the traditional role of military defence. The argument is that one can prevent war by having such strong defences hat a potential enemy knows that an aggressive war cannot be won”[22]
“the traditional role of military defense. Its argument is that one can prevent war by having such strong defenses that a potential enemy knows that an aggressive war cannot be won”[23]
Deterrence Failure: “Deterrence fails when the attacker decides that the defender's threat is not likely to be fulfilled. In this sense it is equally a failure whether the defender really does intend to fight but is unable to communicate that intention to the attacker, or whether he is merely bluffing”[24]
“a challenger commits the action proscribed by the defender, or the defender backs away from a commitment in the face of a challenger´s threats and demands”[25]
“cases in which the attacker either attained his policy goals under the threat of force or resorted to sustained and large-scale use of force”[26]
“defined as an attack on the protégé by regular military forces resulting in more than 250 fatalities, where the attacker gained its principal political or territorial goals even though fatalities were minimal (e.g., Czechoslovakia in 1938, and Goa in 1961), or where the attacker occupied territory of the protégé for several years (e.g., Malaysia in 1964).”[27]
Deterrence Success: “(1) the attacker does not resort to any use of force and does not coerce the protégé/defender into capitulating to his demands, or (2) the attacker resorts to the limited use of force (up to 200-250 fatalities) but is unable to force the protégé/defender to capitulate.”[28]
“deterrent actions of the defender played a central role in the attacker´s decision not to use military force”[29]
“A potential attacker´s restraint from using force because of the deterrer´s threats”[30]
Active deterrence: A strategic threat which is specifically intended to prevent a particular move on the part of an opponent (other than direct attack on the owner of the deterrent).[31]
“strategic threat designed to deter enemy aggression against the friends and allies of a nuclear power and the military forces of that power stationed abroad”[32]
Asymmetric deterrence: “A subset of conventional deterrence, asymmetric deterrence occurs when the weak deter the strong”[33]
Catalytic deterrence: Strategy of “using the existence of a nation’s nuclear arsenal (including the use, or threat of use, of a nuclear explosive test) as a goad to force other nations to intervene”[34]
Chemical deterrence: “the prevention of an enemy from using chemical weapons by having the known ability to escalate to chemical warfare as a counteraction if he does so first”[35]
Classical (Rational) deterrence: “assumes that states can be treated as unitary actors who have a well-defined set of interests, who act to maximize those interests given existing constraints, and who do this through rational decision-making processes based on conscious cost benefit calculations”[36]
“predicts that a state’s threats or commitments will be more likely to deter aggression when they are more credible, meaning that a potential aggressor believes the threats are more likely to be carried out”
“state leaders considering the use of military force compare the expected utility of using force with that of refraining from a military challenge to the status quo, and they select the option with greater expected utility”[37]
Collective actor deterrence: “deterrence by the entire membership against any member thinking about attacking another”[38]
“cooperating states collectively upholding peace and security among themselves, in their region (such as NATO), or the global system (such as the UN Security Council)”[39]
Complex deterrence: “defined as an ambiguous deterrence relationship, which is caused by fluid structural elements of the international system to the extent that the nature and type of actors, their power relationships, and their motives become unclear, making it difficult to mount and signal credible deterrent threats in accordance with the established precepts of deterrence theory”[40]
Comprehensive deterrence: “prevention of adversary action through the existence of credible and proactive physical, cognitive and moral capabilities that raise an adversary’s perceived cost to an unacceptable level of risk relative to the perceived benefit”[41]
Continuous deterrence: “A continuous deterrent presence capable of causing the required level of damage and sustained for the life of the system, representing as close as each system can get to an assured second-strike capability”[42]
Conventional deterrence: “a function of the capability of denying an aggressor his battlefield objectives with conventional forces”[43]
Credible minimum deterrence: maintaining a small, survivable nuclear force at low readiness in peacetime, which poses a credible risk of nuclear retaliation to adversaries but does not guarantee it[44]
“assured retaliatory capabilities to inflict ‘unacceptable damage’ on the aggressor”[45]
“a composite posturing adopted by some nuclear-armed states (especially India and Pakistan) to convey a non-aggressive and defensive nuclear posture by projecting a nuclear arsenal that fulfils the bare needs of defence and security. Accordingly, it implies that the nuclear arsenals will be minimal enough to provide credible deterrence against adversaries”[46]
Cross-domain deterrence: “involves making retaliatory threats from one domain to prevent attacks from another”[47]
“involves using capabilities of one type to counter threats or combinations of threats of another type, in order to prevent unacceptable attacks”[48]
“seeks to counter threats in one arena by relying on unlike capabilities in another area where deterrence may prove more effective”[49]
Cumulative deterrence: “based on the simultaneous use of threats and military force over the course of an extended conflict”[50]
“aims at convincing the Arab world that the Arab-Israeli conflict cannot be solved militarily at an acceptable cost, not only in the foreseeable future but also in the longer run, and thus to persuade Arab political and military elite to end the conflict by political means”[51]
“aimed at convincing any player (state or sub-state) that using violence to achieve its goals is futile”[52]
Cyber deterrence: “First, cyber deterrence can refer to the use of (military) cyber means to deter a (military) attack. Second, cyber deterrence can refer to the use of (military) means to deter a (military) cyber-attack. Third, cyber deterrence can refer to the use of (military) cyber means to deter a (military) cyber-attack”[53]
“deterrence in kind … a capability in cyberspace to do unto others what others may want to do unto us”[54]
Decentralized deterrence: Forces are dispersed as opposed to maintaining a centralized posture[55]
Decision-theoretic deterrence: “utilizes expected utility and game theory to construct models of deterrence; assumption that conflict is always the worst outcome”[56]
Direct deterrence: “consists of efforts by a state to prevent attacks on its own territory—in the U.S. case, within the territorial boundaries of the United States itself”[57]
Existential deterrence: "As long as each side has thermonuclear weapons that could be used against the opponent, even after the strongest possible preemptive attack, existential deterrence is strong and it rests on uncertainty about what could happen”[58]
Extended deterrence: “A declared extension of the intention to retaliate if an attack is made on some specified third-party territory: i.e. a statement that from now on an attack on X-land will be considered an attack on, say, the Soviet Union is a case of extended deterrence”[59]
“involves discouraging attacks on third parties, such as allies or partners”[60]
“a strategy where one nuclear power seeks to deter another not only from attacking it, but also from attacking its allies”[61]
“deterrent power of a state extended to include its allies or its own troops stationed abroad”[62]
Finite deterrence: “A variant (of minimum deterrence) in which a small number of weapons is deployed against a small and stated number of targets. The term has been introduced by advocates of minimum deterrence to escape the connotation of ‘minimum’ with respect to the deterrence of aggression.”[63]
“A variant of minimum deterrence, in which a small number of weapons is deployed against a stated number of targets, as e.g. in the early British targeting policy, whose goal was the capability to destroy four Soviet cities, including Moscow”[64]
“deterrence based on a minimum deterrent capability corresponding to specific calculable needs”[65]
Focused deterrence: “This posture would be maintained for a specific period and focused against a specific adversary, although for ballistic missile systems their inherent range would also enable near-global deterrence. At all other times, the system would adopt a reduced readiness level.”[66]
Full Spectrum deterrence: “capability to deter all forms of aggression”[67]
“designed not only to respond to nuclear attacks but to counter an Indian conventional incursion onto Pakistani territory”[68]
“intends to move Pakistan’s nuclear threshold with India several rungs down the bilateral escalation ladder; deter India from planning and conducting proactive conventional operations; and restore general deterrence against India”[69]
General deterrence: “conveys a somewhat vague, broad, and often steadily continuous threat of retaliation for a possible future attack”[70]
“the ongoing, persistent effort to prevent unwanted actions over the long term and in non-crisis situations”[71]
“is present where (a)relations between opponents are such that at least one would consider attacking if a suitable occasion arose, (b)the other maintains forces and offers warnings of a forceful response to deter attack, and (c)the first party never goes beyond preliminary consideration of attacking because of the threat from the second party”[72]
Graduated deterrence: “a range of deterrent power that affords credible capabilities to inhibit aggression across all, or a considerable portion of, the conflict spectrum”[73]
“relating the size of a deterrent strike to the size and nature of any aggression”[74]
Immediate deterrence: “involves threatening retaliation because an attack is close at hand or in its early stages and has to be halted”[75]
“represents more short-term, urgent attempts to prevent a specific, imminent attack, most typically during a crisis”[76]
“the deliberate implementation of deterrence in a given crisis or adversarial situation, through ad hoc statements and/or signals such as manoeuvres, tests or the raising of alert levels”[77]
Integrated deterrence: “entails working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of US national power, and our network of Alliances and partnerships. Tailored to specific circumstances, it applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint”[78]
“the seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their hostile activities outweigh their benefits”[79]
Intra-war deterrence: “a strategy to convince the enemy that escalation in an existing war is pointless, since the aggressor would merely be destroying himself by inviting retaliation”[80]
“even if a nuclear war breaks out, it need not follow that one must suffer the worst attack the enemy could inflict. As long as the attacked country does not retaliate by, for example, destroying the attacker’s capital city, an element of restraint for the next round would be retained, as there would still be prized centres liable to attack”[81]
“deterrence exercised during a limited or local war designed to inhibit enemy’s escalation and to limit damages”[82]
Maximum deterrence: “the role of nuclear weapons in the defence posture is emphasized – literally maximized – in order to squeeze as much benefit as possible out of deterrence. … Under maximum deterrence, a large quantity of nuclear weapons based on different kinds of delivery vehicles is desirable … Maximum deterrence also requires that one should give the impression of, and plan according to, using nuclear weapons against the opponent’s nuclear weapons forces (counterforce) preemptively, or at least the appearance of being able to launch them promptly in case of tactical warning or if under attack”[83]
Minimum deterrence: “A plausible but technically incorrect strategy based on ‘a few’ weapons which are assumed to be (a) sufficiently destructive to inflict unacceptable damage – in this context defined as the destruction of one or two large cities – and (b) invulnerable. The idea is to obtain a secure strategic defence at low cost, and it is historically associated with the development of the first protected nuclear delivery system, the Polaris submarines”[84]
“Politically plausible but technically dubious, the concept is based on the recognition that even a small number of nuclear weapons can be sufficiently destructive to inflict damage deemed unacceptable by almost all opponents in almost all circumstances”[85]
“the extent of strategic nuclear force, most probably of a second-strike nature, such as a submarine-launched ballistic missile that is thought to be sufficient to deter an enemy from mounting a first strike (also known as finite deterrence)”[86]
“a strategic nuclear force, most probably of a secure second-strike nature, such as a submarine launched ballistic missile, that is thought to be just enough to deter an enemy from mounting a first strike”[87]
“deterrence strategy based on the possession of a small and limited strategic nuclear capability sufficient to deter any nuclear power from rational attack as the penalty for aggression would be unacceptable”[88]
Multi-Actor deterrence: “The notion of a complex system with multiple state and nonstate actors with conflicting and common interests, each with different strengths and weaknesses, and operating within a new security environment in which nuclear proliferation, cyber and space threats, regional and hybrid conflicts simultaneously exist and influence their decision-making processes”[89]
Multi-stable deterrence: “exists when each side is judged by its opponent to have: (a) the ability to respond to the enemy’s best first strike by delivering retaliation that would in normal times be unacceptable, or (b) the ability to deliver a first strike that would disarm the enemy to such a degree that he would probably not be able to deliver a retaliatory blow that would be ‘unacceptable’ in extreme or desperate circumstances”[90]
Mutual deterrence: “A stable situation in which two or more countries or coalitions of countries are inhibited from attacking each other because the casualties or damage resulting from retaliation would be unacceptable”[91]
“When both players have an incentive to upset the status quo”[92]
Naval deterrence: “use naval forces to persuade an adversary not to do something through showing that the likely costs may well outweigh the hoped for benefits. It is based on the potential rather than the actual use of force”[93]
Nuclear deterrence: “Measures to prevent rather than prosecute nuclear wars”[94]
“the threat of using nuclear weapons to prevent the enemy from attacking vital interests”[95]
Passive deterrence: “deterrence of a nuclear first strike on a nuclear power by the threat of retaliation in kind”[96]
Pivotal deterrence: “a form of statecraft used by third parties in a pivotal position between two committed adversaries. The aim is, first of all, to deter both sides and sometimes, in parallel, to drive them toward a compromise solution.” Use of “threats, commitments, and what might be called non- commitments to deflect others from war”[97]
Preserved deterrence: “This posture would only be adopted at low readiness. No deterrent platforms would be regularly deployed but … would maintain the ability to deploy if the context changed. The platforms might be deployed without nuclear weapons for training purposes and could conduct conventional duties as long as they could be made available for deterrent duties if required”[98]
Proportional deterrence: “a nation with a small atomic force can deter a great power (even though the latter has a far superior nuclear capability) because the amount of damage which even a small nuclear force could inflict would exceed the value to the great power of taking over or destroying the smaller state”[99]
“a country can be deterred from acting against another by the threat of incurring damage proportional to the benefit it would have gained by attacking; ‘the deterrence of the strong by the weak’”[100]
“belief that a weak country can deter attack by a stronger one as long as it can impose damage in proportion to its own value as a prize”[101]
“a country can be deterred from acting against another by the threat of incurring damage proportional to the benefit it would have gained by attacking.”[102]
Responsive deterrence: Similar to ‘sustained deterrence’ “but gaps between deployments would be permitted. The frequency and length of deployment would be irregular so that a potential adversary cannot predict when and for how long a gap in deployment might occur.”[103]
Self-deterrence: “The threatener will almost always be deterred in some degree from executing his own threat. Let us call this 'self-deterrence'.”[104]
“states can successfully deter others unintentionally or unknowingly. Because actors can perceive things that are not there, they can be deterred by figments of their own imagination – ‘self-deterrence’ if you will”[105]
“the unwillingness to use coercive military power against an adversary, despite a declaratory threat to do so, due to self-imposed as opposed to other imposed constraints. … (self-deterrence) describes situations in which a powerful actor, even when it is capable of inflicting unacceptable punishment on an opponent, is held back due to factors that are not connected to capability or military retribution by the opponent”[106]
Simultaneous deterrence: Numerous deterrence activities are ongoing simultaneously, often utilizing the same capabilities, and must be managed in such a way as to minimize the risk of both a specific, and more general deterrence failure[107]
Space deterrence: “Preventing adversaries from attacking satellites and other military or economic assets in and through space.”[108]
“deterring harmful actions by whatever means against national assets in space and assets that support space operations.”[109]
Structural deterrence: “closely aligned with realism, argues that a balance of power brings peace; if two states are equal in power, each will be deterred since neither will be able to gain an advantage”[110]
Sustained deterrence: “Deployment of some deterrent capability would be maintained, but not necessarily close to a potential missile launch point. Deployment would be covert (submarines), ambiguous (ship) or dispersed (aircraft) to make it difficult for a potential adversary to predict when they might be within reach of the system”[111]
Symbolic deterrence: “phrase used by some strategic theorists where most would use the idea of minimum deterrence. …The point of calling small nuclear forces ‘symbolically’ deterrent is to stress their uselessness were deterrence ever to fail”[112]
Tailored deterrence: “applying classic deterrence notions to specific cases”[113]
“shift from a ‘one-size-fits-all’ notion of deterrence toward more tailorable approaches appropriate for advanced military competitors, regional WMD states, as well as non-state terrorist networks”[114]
Triadic deterrence: “situation when one state uses threats and/or punishments against another state to coerce it to prevent non-state actors from conducting attacks from its territory”[115]
Twice-extended deterrence: “A double extension of nuclear deterrence (e.g. it is asserted the US might retaliate with nuclear weapons for a nonnuclear attack on NATO which could not otherwise be defeated)”[116]
Type I deterrence: deterrence of direct attack upon one's homeland[117]
Type II deterrence: deterrence of attack upon one's vital interests abroad[118]
Type III deterrence: deterrence of lesser acts[119]
Unilateral deterrence: “one state, a challenger, seeks to upset the status quo while the other state, a defender, tries to keep it”
“characterized by two players with asymmetric motivations: a status quo player who prefers the status quo to all other outcomes and a revisionist player who prefers, unilaterally, to change it”[120]
Weaponless Deterrence: “factory would deter factory, blueprint would deter blueprint, equation would deter equation. … With weaponless deterrence in effect, the strategists would see that any possible escalation in rearmament by one side could be matched by an escalation on the other side, until both were again fully armed and ready to embark on mutual assured destruction. So they would be deterred from rearming”[121]
*Note to readers: This ‘Deterrence Dictionary’ will be periodically updated. Please get in touch with any recommendations for additional terms and definitions.
[1] Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: CJCS, as of November 2021)
[2] Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington, DC: CJCS, 12 April 2001 as amended through 17 October 2007)
[3] Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 11
[4] Snyder, Deterrence and Defense, p. 35
[5] Stephen L. Quackenbush, Understanding General Deterrence, (NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 2
[6] Wolfram F. Hanrieder, Words and arms: dictionary of security and defense terms: with supplementary data (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), p. 37
[7] Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 11
[8] Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2, 1982, p. 317
[9] Vesna Danilovic, “Conceptual and Selection Bias Issues in Deterrence,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 1, 2001, p. 99
[10] Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, “Deterrence: The elusive Dependent Variable,” World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 3, 1990, p. 336
[11] Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference,” World Politics, Vol. 42, No. 4, 1990, p. 471
[12] Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Three Items in One Deterrence as Concept, Research Program, and Political Issue’ in Paul, T. V., Morgan, P. M., & Wirtz, J. J. (Eds.) Complex deterrence: Strategy in the global age (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 37
[13] Adam M. Garfinkle, ‘The attack on deterrence: Reflections on morality and strategic praxis’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 12:2, 1989, p. 171
[14] Patrick M. Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 1
[15] NATO agreed definition, 01/09/1996
[16] Edward Luttwak, A Dictionary of Modern War (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 82
[17] John Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 14.
[18] Michael Mazarr, ‘Understanding Deterrence’, Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, 2020, p.15
[19] Mazarr, ‘Understanding Deterrence’, p. 15
[20] Michael J. Mazarr, Arthur Chan, Alyssa Demus, Bryan Frederick, Alireza Nader, Stephanie Pezard, Julia A. Thompson, Elina Treyger, ‘What Deters and Why Exploring Requirements for Effective Deterrence of Interstate Aggression’, RAND Corporation, 2018, pp. 7-8.
[21] Mazarr, ‘Understanding Deterrence’, p. 15
[22] David Robertson, Guide to modern defense and strategy: a complete description of the terms, tactics, organizations and accords of today's defense (Detroit, MI: Gale Research Co., 1987), p. 102
[23] Jay M. Shafritz, Todd J.A. Shafritz and David B. Robertson, The Facts on File Dictionary of Military Science (New York: Facts on File, 1989), p. 140
[24] Bruce Russett, “The Calculus of Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 7, 1963, p. 98
[25] Lebow and Stein, p. 344
[26] Huth and Russett, p. 490
[27] Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, 1988, p. 31
[28] Huth and Russett, 1990, p. 490
[29] Ibid., p. 491
[30] Danilovic, p. 102
[31] Luttwak, 1971, p. 82
[32] Hanrieder p. 4
[33] Daniel Sobelman, ‘Learning to Deter: Deterrence Failure and Success in the Israel-Hezbollah Conflict, 2006–16’, International Security 2017, 41 (3), p. 161
[34] Frank V. Pabian, ‘South Africa’s Nuclear Program: Lessons for US Nonproliferation Policy’, The Nonproliferation Review, Fall 1995, p. 7
[35] Shafritz, et al., p. 81
[36] Jack S. Levy, ‘When Do Deterrent Threats Work?’, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Oct., 1988), p. 486
[37] Paul K. Huth, ‘Deterrence and International Conflict: Empirical Findings and Theoretical Debates’, Annual Review of Political Science, 2(1999): 28–29
[38] Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 7
[39] Patrick M. Morgan, ‘The Concept of Deterrence and Deterrence Theory’, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Published online: 27 July 2017
[40] T.V. Paul, ‘Introduction,’ in T.V. Paul, Patrick M. Morgan and James J. Wirtz (eds.) Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), p. 8
[41] USASOC, Comprehensive Deterrence, white paper, April 12, 2016. As of September 7, 2016: http://www.soc.mil/Files/ ComprehensiveDeterrenceWhitePaper.pdf
[42] H.M. Government, Trident Alternatives Review, 16 July 2013, pp. 3 to 4: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212745/20130716_Trident_Alternatives_Study.pdf
[43] Mearhseimer, p. 15
[44] Frank O’Donnell & Debalina Ghoshal (2018) Managing Indian deterrence: pressures on credible minimum deterrence and nuclear policy options, The Nonproliferation Review, 25:5-6, p. 419
[45] P.R. Chari (2000) India's nuclear doctrine: Confused ambitions, The Nonproliferation Review, 7:3, p. 132
[46] https://idsa.in/askanexpert/credible-minimum-deterrence-strategic-deterrence-full-spectrum-deterrence
[47] https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2022-12/CrossDomainWeb.pdf
[48] https://quote.ucsd.edu/deterrence/files/2014/12/EGLindsay_CDDOverview_20140715.pdf
[49] https://quote.ucsd.edu/deterrence/files/2014/12/EGLindsay_CDDOverview_20140715.pdf
[50] Doron Almog, ‘Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism’, Parameters, Volume 34, Number 4, Winter 2004 Article 1 11-1-2004, p. 8
[51] Uri Bar‐Joseph, ‘Variations on a theme: The conceptualization of deterrence in Israeli strategic thinking’, Security Studies, 7:3, 1998, p. 148
[52] Uri Tor, ‘“Cumulative Deterrence” as a New Paradigm for Cyber Deterrence’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 40:1-2, 2017, 92-117
[53] Stefan Soesanto & Max Smeets, ‘Cyber Deterrence: The Past, Present, and Future’, Netherlands Annual Review of Military Studies, 2020
[54] Martin C. Libicki, Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar. RAND Corporation, 2009, p. 27
[55] Frank Hoffmann, ‘Decentralized Deterrence Reinvigorating the Army’s Deterrence Impact in the Face of a Modernized People’s Liberation Army’, Military Review, March-April 2022: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/March-April-2022/Hoffman/
[56] Stephen L. Quackenbush, Understanding general deterrence: theory and application (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 6
[57] Mazarr, p. 16
[58] McGeorge Bundy, "The Bishops and the Bomb," The New York Review of Books, June 16, 1983
[59] Luttwak, 1971, p. 82
[60] Mazarr, p. 16
[61] Shafritz, et al., p. 173
[62] Hanrieder, p. 44
[63] Luttwak, 1971, p. 83
[64] Edward Luttwak, The Dictionary of Modern War (New York, Gramercy Books, 1998), p. 167
[65] Hanrieder, p. 46
[66] H.M. Government, Trident Alternatives Review, 2013, p.3
[67] “Inter Services Public Relations Pakistan Press Release No PR133/2013-ISPR,” ISPR, last modified September 5, 2013, cited in Arka Biswas, ‘Pakistan's Tactical Nukes: Relevance and Options for India’, The Washington Quarterly, 40:3, 2017, 169-186
[68] Hans M. Kristensen & Robert S. Norris, ‘Pakistani nuclear forces’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 72:6, 2016, p. 368
[69] Frank O’Donnell, ‘Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons’, Contemporary Security Policy, 38:1, 2017, p. 79
[70] Patrick M. Morgan, ‘The Concept of Deterrence and Deterrence Theory’, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Published online: 27 July 2017
[71] Mazarr, p. 17–18
[72] Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 80
[73] Hanrieder, p. 51
[74] Robertson, p. 101
[75] Patrick M. Morgan, ‘The Concept of Deterrence and Deterrence Theory’, Oxford Research Encyclopedias, Published online: 27 July 2017
[76] Mazarr, p. 18
[77] Bruno Tertrais, “A Taxonomy of Deterrence.” Principles of Nuclear Deterrence and Strategy. NATO Defense College, 2021, p. 7
[78] National Defense Strategy, US Department of Defense, 2022
[79] US National Security Strategy, October 2022: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf
[80] Shafritz, et al., p. 243
[81] Robertson, p. 168
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[87] Robertson, pp. 198-199
[88] Hanrieder p. 72
[89] Michelle Black and Lana Obradovic, “Multi-Actor Deterrence: Defining the Concept” (conference paper presented at the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association and the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association (ISSS-IS) conference, Denver, CO, October 18–19, 2019.
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[94] Hanrieder, p. 85
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[96] Hanrieder, p. 93
[97] Timothy W. Crawford, ‘Pivotal Deterrence and the Kosovo War: Why the Holbrooke Agreement Failed’, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 116, No. 4 (Winter, 2001-2002), pp. 501-502
[98] H.M. Government, Trident Alternatives Review, 2013, p. 4
[99] Wilfrid L. Kohl, ‘The French Nuclear Deterrent’, Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Vol. 29, No. 2, The "Atlantic Community" Reappraised (Nov., 1968), p. 87
[100] Shafritz, et al., p. 369
[101] Robertson, p. 101
[102] Robertson p. 253
[103] H.M. Government, Trident Alternatives Review, 2013, p. 4
[104] Donald G. Brennan, ‘Post‐deployment policy issues in Ballistic missile defence’, Adelphi Papers, 7:43, 1967, pp. 1-23
[105] Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence and Perception’, International Security, 1982-1983, 7:3, 1982-1983, pp. 14-19.
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[107] Jeffrey H. Michaels, ‘Simultaneous Deterrence: Some Policy Considerations for the UK’, October 2018, Changing Caracter of War Centre, Oxford.
[108] Forrest E. Morgan, Deterrence and First-Strike Stability in Space: A Preliminary Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010)
[109] Michael Krepon, “Space and Nuclear Deterrence,” quoted in Michael Krepon and Julia Thomas, eds., Anti-Satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center: 2013), 5.
[110] Stephen L. Quackenbush, ‘Deterrence theory: where do we stand?’, Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (April 2011), p. 743
[111] H.M. Government, Trident Alternatives Review, 2013, p. 4
[112] Robertson, p. 298-299
[113] Mazarr, p. 23
[114] Quadrennial Defense Review Report, US Department of Defense, February 2006, p. 48: https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/quadrennial/QDR2006.pdf?ver=2014-06-25-111017-150
[115] Boaz Atzili and Wendy Pearlman, ‘Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength, Beaten by Weakness’, Security Studies, 21 (2012), p. 301
[116] Luttwak, 1998, p. 166
[117] Colin S. Gray, ‘The definitions and assumptions of deterrence: Questions of theory and practice’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 13:4, p. 5
[118] Gray, ‘The definitions and assumptions of deterrence’, p. 5
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[120] Zagare, ‘The Logic of Deterrence’, p. 49
[121] Jonathan Schell, ‘The abolition’, The Washington Quarterly, 20:3, 1997, p. 146